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Presented is a methodology to analyze the expected Levelised Cost Of 
Electricity (LCOE) in the face of technology uncertainty for Accelerator-
Driven Subcritical Reactors (ADSRs). It shows that flexibility in the 
design and deployment strategy of an ADSR park demonstrator 
significantly reduces its expected LCOE. The methodology recognizes in 
the conceptual design a range of possible technological outcomes for 
the ADSR accelerator system. It identifies flexibility “on” and “in” the 
design to modify the future development path in light of such uncertain 
scenarios. Uncertainty and flexibility are incorporated in the ADSR 
valuation. The resulting economic assessment is more realistic than 
typical discounted cash flow analysis that does not consider a range of 
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 Introduction 
Thorium-fuelled Accelerator-Driven Subcritical Reactor (ADSR) technology is a 
promising avenue for transmutation of radioactive wastes (Bowman et al., 1992; 
Foster, 1974), and for secure, low-emission, and more publicly acceptable power 
generation (Carminati et al., 1993). It consists of a nuclear reactor core operating 
subcritically, and a high-power accelerator bombarding a spallation target within 
the reactor with a particle beam to generate additional neutrons to sustain the 
chain reaction (Figure 1). This technology offers new potentials for governments 
concerned with limiting CO2 emissions, reducing risks associated with nuclear 
weapons proliferation and geological waste disposal, and sustaining prosperous 
economic development. In countries with considerable thorium reserves (e.g. 
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India), it has the potential to capture a non-trivial segment of the growing 
electricity market. In other countries, it can help diversify the portfolio of low 
CO2-emitting technologies. 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual representation of an ADSR system for power generation (adapted from Rubbia 
et al., 1995). 
 
Evaluating the Cost of Uncertain Technology 
Developing thorium-fuelled ADSR technology promises to be technically 
challenging, economically risky, and capital-intensive. Traditional nuclear power 
technology has high capital cost (Pouret et al., 2009), and requires many years of 
pre-development, construction, and testing before providing online capacity. 
Combining it with accelerator technology will require additional capital 
commitment, and involve significant extra financial uncertainty. Given the high 
upfront cost and technological uncertainty involved, one needs a realistic picture 
on expected deployment cost, one that explicitly recognizes this uncertainty. 
 
There is much uncertainty on how technology will develop during the initial 
deployment phase of a first-of-a-kind ADSR demonstrator. This uncertainty will 
ultimately affect the Levelised Cost of generating Electricity (LCOE), useful to 
evaluate cost and economic performance. One concern unique to ADSR 
technology relates to the reliability of the accelerator producing the particle-
beam. If an unplanned shutdown of an accelerator leads to an ADSR shutdown, 
then costs are incurred due to failing to supply the electricity grid (Steer et al., 
2009). Alternatively if unplanned shutdowns are eliminated through spending 
additional time performing maintenance on the accelerator, there is less time to 
schedule operation of the accelerator and sell electricity to the grid. 
 
The concept of “effective availability” is introduced here to characterize how an 
uncertain accelerator technology may develop in the future. Effective availability 
of an accelerator represents the percentage of time over the year that the 
accelerator is in operation. It cannot be 100% due to normal expected 
maintenance activities over the year. For example, if accelerator technology 
develops well and is reliable (i.e. unplanned shutdowns are infrequent), effective 
availability can be high because unplanned maintenance is limited. In contrast, 
effective availability will be low, if accelerator technology is unreliable, causing 
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many unplanned shutdowns and maintenance periods. Technical details and 
assumptions are provided in Steer et al. (2010). 
 
Effective availability ultimately determines the capacity factor of the ADSR, 
which is the main enabler of economic value for the system. The capacity factor 
is defined as the ratio of actual electricity produced during the year to the total 
output had the plant operated at full capacity throughout the year. The ADSR can 
only generate electricity and therefore revenue when both the accelerator and 
reactor systems are working correctly. Effective availability is an analogous 
concept to capacity factor, but it relates to the accelerator system because this 
system cannot in and of itself produce electricity. If the reactor system were to 
be 100% reliable, then the accelerator system's effective availability and the 
ADSR capacity factor would be equal. Hence if the accelerator effective 
availability is high, the ADSR capacity factor can be high, and more electricity can 
be produced and sold to the grid. If it is low, the ADSR capacity factor is low, and 
not as much electricity is produced, thus lowering revenues. 
 
ADSRs are expected to maximize economic value through multiple reactors being 
constructed at the same geographical site. Such a “reactor park” will benefit from 
reduced operating costs through sharing facilities and additional capital cost 
savings due to economies of scale, and learning effects (NEA, 2000). However 
unique to ADSRs and the topic of this paper, it is hypothesized that the operation 
of multiple reactors is more efficient if accelerators are shared through an 
integrated network. 
 
Not Considering Uncertainty Leads to Incorrect Cost Assessment 
Not recognizing uncertainty in the early conceptual design phase may lead to 
incorrect and unrealistic economic valuation of technological deployment costs. 
Thus, estimating LCOE of an ADSR design based on one expert forecast for 
electricity and fuel prices, construction costs, capacity factor, and beam 
availability may turn out to be severely incorrect. 
 
There are essentially three reasons for this. First, research has shown that expert 
forecasts can be biased and incorrect for a number of reasons (Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990). Hence, it is most likely that exogenous uncertainties like 
electricity and fuel prices, construction costs, or endogenous ones like capacity 
factor and beam availability will not turn out as planned for the entire project 
lifecycle. Second, even in the unlikely event that forecasts are correct, Savage’s 
“Flaw of Averages” (2000) shows that any decision based on the “average” or 
“most likely” scenario may lead to incorrect results, and bad investment 
decisions. This is a consequence of Jensen’s inequality for non-linear systems, 
which implies that E[f(x)]  f(E[x]). In other words, the benefits generated by 
upside scenarios (e.g. high electricity price or demand) are limited by capacity, 
such that on average, the effect of low demand, loss-generating scenarios cannot 
be exactly counterbalanced. The net result is that the expected economic 
performance is different than when only one central most likely scenario is used 
for valuation. Third, typical discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation methods do 
not incorporate the fact that uncertain factors like fuel cost, electricity price, 
technology, and the regulatory environment will inevitably change over the long 
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lifecycle of a nuclear project. The LCOE metric used in this study is also subject to 
this shortcoming: it discounts back to present value cost and revenue projections 
made over an entire 40+ years lifecycle. Traditional valuation methods assume 
full commitment at t = 0 to a particular deployment path or strategy over the 
entire lifecycle. For instance, it assumes that plants may be deployed and become 
operational to generate revenues at specific times. It assumes a particular price 
of electricity and annual percentage growth, etc. The reality is that things will 
change along the way, and managers will adapt to keep operating the system in 
the best available conditions. This reality is not captured in traditional valuation 
methods (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis, 1996). This can significantly affect 
investment decisions on large-scale technology deployment, as case studies 
demonstrate in many other industries: aerospace (de Weck et al., 2004), airports 
(de Neufville and Odoni, 2003; Kwakkel et al., 2010), petroleum (Jablonowski et 
al., 2008), ports (Taneja et al., 2010), and real estate (Foster and Lee, 2009). 
 
In short, consequences of not recognizing uncertainty may be that: 
 
- The design deployment strategy is sub-optimal as soon as reality departs 
from the forecast or chosen parameters, either because it cannot easily 
adapt to reduce exposure to downside conditions (i.e. over capacity 
investment), or cannot access upside opportunities (i.e. under capacity 
investment); 
 
- The cost of switching between alternative operating scenarios may be 
higher if contingencies are not carefully planned ahead of time to ease the 
switch (Silver and de Weck, 2007); and 
 
- Importantly from a policy perspective, the project may be undervalued, or 
be more expensive than it is in reality, resulting in an incorrect message 
to private and public investors about the true potential of a new 
technology. 
 
Flexibility Can Reduce Costs, But… 
Pioneering work in the real options literature shows how managerial flexibility 
leads to additional economic value, reduced costs, and/or overall better 
investment decisions (Cox et al., 1979; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Myers, 1977; 
Trigeorgis, 1996). This body of work is among the first to quantify economically 
the value to adapt flexibly to changing circumstances. It recognizes the ability to 
limit exposure to downside risks, and plan contingencies to capitalize on upside 
opportunities.  
 
This literature typically focuses on valuation of real options “on” projects. It 
considers managerial flexibility on the project as a whole without necessarily 
requiring technical inputs from designers and engineers. In Trigeorgis’ taxonomy 
(1996), deferring investment until optimal market conditions are met is an 
example of a real option “on” a project. Abandoning a project doomed to fail, or 
investing in Research and Development (R&D) to access future cash flows of a 
novel technology (Luehrman, 1998) – if it works – can also be categorized as real 
options “on” projects. 
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A number of examples show that real options “in” projects also lead to significant 
value improvements.i A real option “in” the project is enabled through technical 
inputs from engineers and designers. In Trigeorgis’ taxonomy, the ability to 
phase a project, to expand or contract operating scale, and switch production 
inputs and outputs are examples of real options “in” projects. For instance, de 
Weck et al. (2004) show that phasing deployment and re-organizing the orbital 
configuration of communication satellites could have saved up to 30% in 
investment cost to Iridium and Globalstar in the 1990s. Lin (2009) shows 
economic value improvement up to 78% through phasing offshore oil platform 
development and altering production capacity, as compared to an initial, 
inflexible design. 
 
…It Requires Guidance in the Early Design Phase 
There is very little work on integrated methodologies to 1) incorporate the 
concept of flexibility in standard design and decision-making practice, and 2) 
evaluate its economic impact to guide large-scale innovative investments. This is 
because identifying valuable real option opportunities in complex systems is a 
challenging process. It requires careful analytical considerations in the early 
conceptual design phase, and not many analytical tools exist to assist designers 
in doing so. In addition, as outlined by Barman and Nash (2007), the traditional 
real options methodology used to value flexibility – surveyed below – has 
suffered bad publicity, being considered too mathematically oriented to serve 
immediate practical purposes for design and decision-making. Other practical 
reasons might be that: 
 
There is no “one fits all” solution for implementing flexibility. Each system is 
different, and is subject to different uncertainty sources. An infinite number of 
uncertainty sources can affect the performance of systems (e.g. environmental, 
market-driven, operational, regulatory, technological, etc.). It is difficult to 
identify important ones to focus the design effort. Equally, a considerable 
number of flexible strategies can be explored, depending on the system (e.g. 
phase capacity deployment, alter operating scale, switch product input/output, 
abandon or temporarily shut down activities, delay investment, etc.). Designers 
need to identify valuable opportunities, and engineer relevant design variables 
and parameters to enable flexibility. Furthermore, they may need to negotiate 
legal and/or financial disposition to enable flexibility. 
 
- Designers operate within institutional, possibly cultural, engineering 
“silos” and do not consider how other system components might affect 
the overall economic value of the system. Dong (2002) shows this for the 
car manufacturing industry system-level knowledge (required to think 
about real options “in” systems in the early design phase) is not well 
documented across different systems disciplines. It took Lin (2009) about 
a year of close collaboration with oil platform engineers to find out about 
sub-sea tiebacks as a valuable real option. This is not because designers 
                                                 
i See http://ardent.mit.edu/real_options/Common_course_materials/papers.html for case 
studies in many industries. 
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did not know or think the real option would be valuable, rather they were 
not actively engaged in discussions with sub-surface engineers to 
consider this design component. 
 
- Designers think they adequately consider uncertainty and risk when they 
subject a design to a range of scenarios through sensitivity analysis after 
an initial design is crafted. This approach, however, does not consider 
uncertainties in the early conceptual phase prior to more detailed design 
analysis. It does not recognize the power of adapting pro-actively to 
changing future conditions, and the potential to increase economic value 
by doing so. 
 
- Engineering focuses predominantly on detailed (exact or high-fidelity) 
models. Such models are often computationally expensive and cannot be 
used to explore many design configurations including flexibility and 
managerial decision rules under a wide range of uncertain scenarios. 
 
A More Realistic Valuation Approach: Real Options 
Many authors have applied the real options methodology to value flexibility 
under typical uncertainty scenarios encountered in the nuclear industry. This 
methodology augments traditional valuation methods like Net Present Value 
(NPV) to recognize explicitly the flexibility to adapt as uncertainty unfolds. It is 
not part, however, of a clear, systematic framework extending standard design 
and decision-making practice for uncertainty and flexibility. It is concerned 
mostly with the economic valuation aspect, and not how these opportunities for 
flexibility are created in the design process. 
 
For example, Pindyck (1993) shows that additional economic value exists when 
managers recognize the flexibility to abandon construction of a new nuclear 
plant if technology and cost evolve unfavourably. These uncertainties can only be 
resolved once the irreversible investment is made, as more information is 
revealed. Kiriyama and Suzuki (2004) assess the value of waiting for optimal 
market conditions before investing in a new nuclear build (i.e. a deferral real 
option). They use an approach similar analytically to Pindyck (2000), although 
using CO2 emission credit as the driving source of uncertainty. Rothwell (2006) 
assumes that a portfolio of tradable assets is available – both real and financial – 
to replicate the cash flows of a new nuclear build in the United States, based on 
the dynamic programming approach presented by Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
Abdelhamid et al. (2009) use a similar approach to evaluate the option to defer 
investment in the first nuclear plant built in Tunisia. Marreco and Carpio (2006) 
use a binomial lattice methodology based on the approach by Cox et al. (1979) to 
value the operational flexibility to switch between nuclear thermoelectric and 
hydroelectric generation in the Brazilian power system. Siddiqui and Fleten 
(2008a) value a portfolio of government investments in R&D for a large-scale 
alternative energy source, mainly nuclear, alongside an existing renewable 
energy technology. A similar approach is used to assess the value of the flexibility 
to stage R&D in thorium-fuelled nuclear technology (Siddiqui and Fleten, 2008b), 
and to value the optimal timing for nuclear waste disposal in deep geological 
formations (Loubergé et al., 2002). 
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Main Contribution 
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate application of an 
integrated methodology to investigate whether flexibility can reduce the 
expected deployment cost of an innovative nuclear technology development. The 
methodology builds upon and extends standard practice for design and decision-
making by considering a priori a range of uncertain outcomes affecting those 
costs, and adequate flexible responses. It provides a framework for assessing the 
value of flexibility so it can be compared to its acquisition cost. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, the methodology 
employed is explained; there then follows an example application to the 
deployment of a demonstration ADSR reactor park. The paper is concluded by a 
discussion of the model assumptions and limitations, as well as the findings. 
Guidance for future work is also provided. 
 
 Proposed Methodology 
The methodology is based on the four-step process described by Babajide et al. 
(2009), similar to the one suggested by Walker et al. (2001) for adaptive policy. 
The perspective is taken of a single profit-driven company involved in 
constructing the plant, and selling the electricity generated. The hypothesis is 
that flexibility will improve net economic value by reducing expected LCOE. 
 
Step 1 consists of developing a basic economic model in Excel® to determine a 
benchmark design and deployment cost. LCOE is the main economic metric, 
measured in £/MWh. It is directly comparable to the price of electricity – also 
expressed in £/MWh – to assess profitability of a design. The economic analysis 
is based on LINear ACcelerator (LINAC) technology. Equivalent analysis using 
other types of accelerator would be equally valid. LINAC technology is chosen 
because construction and operating cost data are readily available. 
 
Step 2 focuses on recognizing and characterizing different sources of uncertainty 
affecting LCOE in the benchmark design configuration. To simplify 
demonstration, one major source of uncertainty is characterized, quantified, and 
incorporated in the benchmark economic model.  
 
Step 3 focuses on identifying and suggesting candidate flexible strategies to deal 
with the uncertainty source from step 2. It also identifies relevant design 
components to enable the flexibility. These considerations are added to the 
benchmark economic model. It provides means of investigating different design 
configurations.  
 
Step 4 makes use of decision analysis – a simplified, more intuitive 
implementation of dynamic programming than is used in typical real options 
valuations – to analyze the flexible deployment options emerging from steps 2 
and 3. It recommends a deployment strategy using expected LCOE as the 
decision metric. Other economic metrics are introduced to demonstrate how 
they may affect decision-making. 
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 Case Application and Results 
 
Step 1: Development of Basic Economic Model 
This paper builds on the analysis by Steer et al. (2010), characterizing the 
technology and economics of a first-of-a-kind ADSR demonstratorii. The 
benchmark inflexible design in the initial deployment phase has constructed one 
accelerator and one reactor (1 accelerator/1 reactor configuration), and extends 
over eight years. For this benchmark model, accelerator technology is assumed 
to provide 70% effective availability. This implies that the first-of-a-kind ADSR 
has a slightly lower capacity factor than a typical Generation III nuclear power 
station (capacity factor of 85%).  
 
This configuration is then expanded to a demonstration reactor park with three 
reactors and three accelerators (3 accelerators/3 reactors configuration) (see 
Figure 2). Each accelerator-reactor pair is independent: an accelerator can only 
transport its beam to one of the reactors. Construction of each ADSR is phased so 
that no two ADSRs are constructed in parallel. The total declared net capacity of 
the site (1,800 MWe) is chosen to be comparable with Generation III nuclear site 
capacity in the United Kingdom (World Nuclear Association, 2009). It is, 
however, well below the capacity of the U.K.’s largest coal-fired plant, Drax, at 
3,960 MWe. 
 
Table 1 shows additional financial assumptions associated with the construction 
and operation of the demonstration reactor park. Under these assumptions, the 
LCOE of the benchmark design is £63.66/MWh. Figure 3 shows in a decision 
treeiii format that this is similar to assuming that the central 70% effective 
availability (EA) estimate arises with probability = 1.00. It implicitly ignores all 
other technological scenarios – ultimately leading to a range of capacity factors 
and LCOEs – by setting their probability to 0. 
 
Such simplified assessment, although a necessary starting point for the analysis, 
is unrealistic. It ignores the possibility that accelerator technology may turn out 
better during the first-of-a-kind demonstrator phase, thus leading to more 
electricity production, and lower LCOE. It also ignores the possibility that the 
technology may be worse, thus leading to less electricity, and higher LCOE. It 
ignores altogether the possibility of making a different decision after the initial 
deployment phase, as some technological uncertainty is resolved. In other words, 
this assessment is typical of traditional economic valuation. It assumes full 
commitment at the time of the irreversible investment (t = 0), and relies on 
expert forecasts for the main uncertain design variables and parameters. 
 
                                                 
ii The spreadsheet of the cost model employed for this paper is available here: 
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/CardinModelEPRG1018.xls 
iii By convention, a square node corresponds to a decision point, while a circle corresponds to a 
“chance”, or uncertainty outcome. The probability (p) of an outcome is written under the 
outcome branch. The LCOE of each scenario is displayed at the terminal node, with the associated 
probability of occurrence. TreeAge Pro® is used for decision analysis. 
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Figure 2: Conceptual representation of the 3 accelerators/3 reactors demonstration park. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Decision tree assuming probability p = 1.00 for the central effective availability (EA) 
estimate. 
 
Step 2: Uncertainty Recognition and Characterization 
There are many sources of uncertainty affecting the expected performance of the 
system. One is uranium price, an example of exogenous uncertainty. If the price 
of uranium remains relatively low in the future, this will not favour thorium as 
an alternative fuel. Another source of uncertainty is whether a strong market for 
waste disposal will emerge in the future, favouring ADSR systems for 
transmutation rather than power generation. Future carbon emission credits 
would also ultimately affect the profitability of ADSR systems. In terms of 
endogenous design uncertainty, it is not yet clear what the best choice of 
technology is for coolant, reactor geometry, and spallation target (e.g. with or 
without window). Delays can also affect overall construction cost, as in most new 
nuclear builds. 
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Table 1: List of parameters for the DCF model. These are additional parameters to those described in 
Steer et al. (2010), which forms the basis of the financial analysis. 
Parameter Assumption Source/Comment 
Initial pre-development costs £250 million 
Identical to the value in Steer et al 
(2010), this covers all pre-
development costs for the whole 
reactor park. 
Declared Net Capacity 
600 MWe per reactor, subtract 
20 MWe from the reactor park 
total if it is operating one more 
accelerator than the number of 
reactors 
 
Time required to construct 
additional reactor and 
accelerator(s) in phases 2 and 3 
6 years  
Timing of construction phase 2 
Begins 2 years after initial reactor 
(phase 1) begins selling electricity 
 
Timing of construction phase 3 
Immediately after phase 2 is 
completed 
 
Construction cost of nth-of-kind 
reactors and accelerators 
Identical to the costs of the 1st-of-a-
kind 
Cost reductions due to learning 
effects of the new technology have 
been neglected. 
Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) of nuclear reactors 
£7.70 /MWh when operating a 
single reactor, followed by a 
£3.85 /MWh increase per 
additional reactor. 
Operating reactors in parallel 
assumes that the O&M cost of 
each additional reactor is 50% of 
the base cost. 
O&M of accelerators 
£34 million per annum when 
operating a single accelerator, 
followed by a £17 million per 
annum increase per additional 
accelerator. 
Operating accelerators in parallel 
assumes that the O&M cost of 
each additional accelerator is 50% 
of the base cost. 
Planning for constructing 
additional accelerators in 
phases 2 and 3 
£20 million is paid during phase 1 
for each accelerator that may be 
constructed later. If the accelerator 
is constructed, the £20 million is 
subtracted from the build cost at 
that time 
Taken from Steer et al (2010). The 
cost of planning for additional 
reactors is neglected as in all 
scenarios considered in this paper 
one reactor is constructed in each 
construction phase. The 
uncertainty in the cost of 
constructing a reactor will be 
significantly larger than the total 
cost of planning for their future 
construction. 
 
Effective availability is the main endogenous source of uncertainty considered in 
this study. This is because it significantly impacts the potential success of 
accelerator technology development and reliability, which ultimately determines 
cost. The study assumes this uncertainty can be resolved significantly during the 
first-of-a-kind demonstration phase, although clearly not entirely. As seen from 
the historical development of nuclear power in the United States, the capacity 
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factor of nuclear power plants has evolved slowly to reach today’s value of 85% 
or more (Moen, 2010). 
Three scenarios for effective availability are considered and summarized in 
Table 2. Scenario 1 depicts an optimistic case where effective availability is 85%. 
Scenario 2 expects the accelerator system of a single-accelerator ADSR to limit 
electricity sales to slightly less than the intentions for Generation III nuclear 
reactors (effective availability of 70%). Scenario 3 investigates a pessimistic view 
where the effective availability of a reactor driven by a single accelerator is no 
more than 50%. 
 
Table 2: Summary of three uncertain accelerator technology scenarios considered in this analysis. 
Scenario 
Effective availability (EA) 
estimate of a reactor driven by a 
single accelerator (%) 
1 – Optimistic 85 
2 – Central 70 
3 – Pessimistic 50 
 
In this example, no particular information favours one scenario over another, 
and all scenarios are considered equally likely (p = 1/3 for all scenarios).iv A 
sensitivity analysis on this particular assumption is given below. 
 
The DCF model is modified to enable variations in the effective availability 
parameter. The decision tree in Figure 4 shows the LCOE under each scenario, 
leading to an expected LCOE (E[LCOE]) of £68.09/MWh for the benchmark 
design. Figure 4 makes clear that the deterministic benchmark assessment is 
only one of several possible technology development scenarios. It also shows 
that E[LCOE] differs and is actually more expensive than the benchmark 
assessment (£63.66/MWh). 
 
 
Figure 4: Decision tree for the benchmark design recognizing uncertainty in accelerator reliability. 
 
Figure 5 shows a Cumulative Mass Function (CMF) – also called “target curve” by 
de Neufville and Scholtes (2010) – for the benchmark design with and without 
uncertainty recognition. This graphical representation is helpful for decision-
makers to identify the range of possible outcomes a particular design may 
                                                 
iv Other assumptions can be used in the framework for probability distributions. The example 
analysis below would then give rise to another valuation, and potentially different design choices. 
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produce. It changes the design paradigm from using one LCOE for decision-
making (as in step 1) to a range of probabilistic outcomes. For example, it shows 
there is a one third probability of obtaining a target LCOE between £53.47/MWh 
and £63.66/MWh. This quantifies the upside opportunities this kind of design 
may provide. Similarly, there is a one third probability of obtaining a target LCOE 
between £63.66/MWh and £87.15/MWh, which characterizes downside 
situations. E[LCOE] is also shown as a vertical dashed line. For reference, the 
benchmark assessment in step 1 is shown as a solid vertical line. 
 
 
Figure 5: Target curves for the benchmark design with and without uncertainty recognition. 
 
Step 3: Identifying Candidate Opportunities for Flexibility 
Three major sources of flexibility are suggested to deal with uncertainty in ADSR 
effective availability, based on general flexible strategies in Trigeorgis (1996). 
The first is a strategic growth option “on” the system, expressed through the 
initial deployment phase for a first-of-a-kind demonstrator. This gives the “right 
but not the obligation” to expand to a demonstration reactor park if the 
accelerator reliability and technology is good enough. For this flexibility to be 
enabled, engineers should secure a site ahead of time so that additional ADSR 
systems can be added. This involves planning for sharing infrastructures in the 
case of expansion, choosing appropriate zoning, and setting all legal and financial 
aspects to enable expansion. 
 
The second source of flexibility is an operational switching option “in” design. 
This flexibility is enabled by constructing a beam transport system such that all 
of the accelerators can direct their proton beam to any one of the reactors as 
required, at any given time. This creates an integrated reactor park with a single 
network of accelerators. This is useful when one of the reactors is down for 
scheduled maintenance. It provides the redundancy to switch to another 
accelerator if another experiences a scheduled or unscheduled shutdown. 
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The third source of flexibility is a strategic scale alteration option “in” design. It 
further enables the operational flexibility – or redundancy – just described. It is 
obtained by designing the system with contingency to add one more accelerator 
to increase effective availability in case it is too low due to frequent unscheduled 
shutdowns in the initial development phase. Other facets of the ADSR design are 
expected to have a significant, perhaps more significant, impact on its overall 
availability, such as if it is designed to operate as a fast reactor or is thorium 
fuelled. However, these challenges are wider reaching issues, affecting numerous 
nuclear reactor designs. Accelerator reliability is a unique challenge to ADSRs 
and has the potential to have a determining effect on the overall availability of 
ADSRs. Similar to the other strategic options, this may require securing a site for 
additional accelerator(s) and/or reactor(s), to potentially share infrastructures, 
and harmonize O&M schedules between accelerators and reactors. 
 
The analysis presented in this paper focuses on the second and third sources of 
flexibility. These protect essentially from downside risks in power generation, in 
case technology does not perform as hoped. It is assumed that development 
moves on with a reactor park, which is why the first source of flexibility has not 
been considered in the quantitative analysis. Decision-makers may decide not to 
pursue this plan after the first-of-a-kind demonstrator phase, in which case the 
analysis in Steer et al. (2010) introduces some of the possible outcomes. 
 
Step 4: Evaluation of Design Configurations 
Decision-makers may choose between three strategies, as Figure 6 depicts in the 
decision tree.v At the time of irreversible investment (t = 0), the first strategy is 
to select the upper branch and pursue the benchmark deployment in Figure 4. 
No adjustment is possible at the second decision node (t = 8 years). It assumes 
full commitment to the demonstration reactor park. The LCOE is dependent on 
how technological uncertainties unfold during the initial first-of-a-kind phase. 
This strategy is best if technology turns out better than expected, as in the 
optimistic case. It then makes sense to move on directly to a 3 accelerators/3 
reactors configuration. It provides the lowest LCOE (£53.47/MWh) by saving the 
need for an additional accelerator. If the pessimistic scenario arises however, the 
plant becomes more costly (£87.15/MWh) as it does not have any means of 
exploiting redundancy to cope with deficient accelerator reliability. 
 
All of the options for the two flexible strategies are shown together in Figure 7. 
The first flexible strategy (the second strategy overall) starts with a benchmark 1 
accelerator/1 reactor configuration. It plans for the possibility of having a fourth 
accelerator in the second phase to exploit the operational flexibility to switch 
proton beams if effective availability is low. It does not, however, have the 
benefit of redundancy to switch accelerators in the first phase. The benefit is to 
save initially on additional capital expenditures, while risking producing less 
electricity in the first phase if effective availability is low. From there, managers 
                                                 
v Sub-optimal decision branches are marked with a double hash in the dynamic programming – 
backward induction – phase of decision analysis. Branches with no hashing represent the best 
decision at a given decision node. The expected LCOE is shown under each branch at a decision 
point, in a square box. The recommended design is outlined in the box to the right and below the 
first, leftmost, decision point. 
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may choose to expand to either 4 accelerators/3 reactors or 3 accelerators/3 
reactors configurations. In the optimistic scenario, the best decision is to expand 
to a 3 accelerators/3 reactors configuration, as expected. The LCOE 
(£53.78/MWh) is only slightly higher than for the inflexible case (£53.47/MWh) 
due to the cost of planning for a fourth accelerator in the initial phase, although it 
is not used. For the central and pessimistic scenarios, it is better to exploit the 
operational switching flexibility by adding an additional accelerator. The LCOE 
(£60.37/MWh and £64.99/MWh respectively) is lower than for the inflexible 
strategy in both cases (£63.66/MWh and £87.15/MWh respectively), essentially 
due to increased effective availability and higher electricity production. 
 
 
Figure 6: Decision tree for the real options analysis of a demonstration ADSR park. 
 
 
Figure 7: Conceptual representation of the two flexible strategies to deploying a demonstration 
ADSR park. The faintly coloured reactors, accelerators and beam transport systems are planned for, 
but not yet constructed. 
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The second flexible strategy (the third strategy overall), shown as the lower 
branch, exploits operational switching flexibility and requires an additional 
accelerator at the outset. This alternative also recognizes the strategic flexibility 
to expand to the most appropriate configuration depending on the effective 
availability scenario arising in the initial phase. It starts with a 2 accelerators/1 
reactor design, and has the possibility to expand to either of the 4 accelerators/3 
reactors or 3 accelerators/3 reactors configurations. Therefore, if the optimistic 
scenario arises, it is appropriate to construct only one more accelerator in 
addition to two reactors to reach a 3 accelerators/3 reactors configuration. The 
LCOE is £60.00/MWh, however, considerably higher than for the inflexible 
strategy under this scenario (£53.47/MWh). This is also more than for the 
flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor configuration (£53.78/MWh), mainly due to the 
purchase of an unnecessary accelerator in the initial phase. If the central and 
pessimistic cases arise, it is better to expand to a 4 accelerators/3 reactors 
configuration. The extra electricity production provided by the additional 
accelerator outweighs the additional cost in these scenarios. For the central 
scenario, the LCOE (£61.72/MWh) is only slightly higher than for the flexible 1 
accelerator/1 reactor configuration (£60.37/MWh) due to the early purchase of 
a redundant accelerator. The additional production capacity gives, however, a 
lower LCOE than for the inflexible case (£63.66/MWh). If the pessimistic 
scenario arises, the 2 accelerators/1 reactor configuration gives the best 
protection against downsides. It exploits the flexibility from the redundant 
accelerator in both development phases, which improves electricity production. 
The LCOE is £61.94/MWh compared to a high of £87.15/MWh for the inflexible, 
and £64.99/MWh for the flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor design. 
 
The recommended strategy depends on the utility of the decision-maker. For 
example, a risk-neutral decision-maker prefers a strategy minimizing the 
expected – or average – LCOE (E[LCOE]). This is the best metric for trading-off 
the chances of optimistic and pessimistic technology scenarios. It will not 
provide, however, the possibility of attaining the lowest absolute LCOE in the 
decision tree. As Figure 6 shows for the two flexible strategies, the lowest 
attainable LCOE is £53.78/MWh, as opposed to £53.47/MWh for the inflexible 
strategy. On the other hand, it also reduces the impact from a downside 
pessimistic scenario. The worst possible outcome is LCOE of £64.99/MWh, as 
opposed to the worst of all scenarios for the inflexible case (£87.15/MWh). 
 
Thus, under the assumption of a uniform prior probability distribution (i.e. 
complete uncertainty), a risk-neutral decision-maker will prefer the flexible 1 
accelerator/1 reactor design, with E[LCOE] = £59.71/MWh. The flexible 2 
accelerators/1 reactor is not too far behind at E[LCOE] = £61.22/MWh. Both 
flexible strategies are noticeably better using this metric than for the inflexible 
strategy with E[LCOE] = £68.09/MWh. The decision to expand to a 3 or 4 
accelerators/3 reactors demonstration park is based on how uncertainty is 
resolved during the first eight years of development. 
 
The expected value of flexibility can be compared to the anticipated cost of the 
flexible first-of-a-kind demonstrator. This is the difference in E[LCOE] between 
the inflexible and the best flexible strategies. As a rule of thumb, decision-makers 
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should not be willing to pay more than this value for the additional design and 
engineering cost, and requirements of a flexible park demonstrator. The cost of 
the additional accelerator (£290 million + interest) is already factored into the 
model. Comparing the flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor to the inflexible design 
shows still positive expected value for the flexible strategy: 
 
E[Vflex.] = E[LCOEinflex.] – E[LCOEflex.] = £68.09/MWh – £59.71/MWh  = £8.38/MWh 
 
Target curves in Figure 8 depict graphically the information in the decision tree 
for the 1 accelerator/1 reactor inflexible and flexible designs. They show that a 
strategy recognizing uncertainty and planning for appropriate flexibility in a 1 
accelerator/1 reactor design provides much lower expected LCOE (dashed light 
vertical line) than in the initial deterministic assessment of step 1 (vertical solid 
line), and also compared to the stochastic but inflexible analysis of step 2 
(vertical dark dashed line). They also show the probabilistic range of LCOE for 
the two deployment strategies (solid dark curve for inflexible; solid light curve 
for flexible). It is observed that E[LCOEflex.] is lower than for the inflexible case 
mainly because this strategy is better at protecting from downside risks in 
technology development (i.e. it avoids high LCOE outcomes from poor 
accelerator technology). 
 
 
Figure 8: Target curves for inflexible and flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor demonstration park 
deployment strategies. 
 
a) Other Utility Metrics for Decision-Making 
It is possible that E[LCOE] is not the metric of choice for all decision-makers. 
Table 3 lists other metrics useful for decision-making, depending on the 
decision-maker’s utility. For instance, a risk-averse individual might prefer a 
design minimizing initial capital expenditure, or reducing to the best extent 
possible the impact from a pessimistic technology scenario. Similarly, a risk-
seeking decision-maker might choose a design giving the lowest possible LCOE, 
at the risk of obtaining the worst possible outcome – as in the inflexible design – 
if technology is poor and effective availability is low. The best strategy thus 
depends on the metric used, and the decision-maker’s utility. 
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Table 3: Other metrics for evaluating alternative design strategies, with recommended decisions. 
Metric 
Benchmark 
(unrealistic) 
Inflexible 
1 accel./    
1 reactor 
Flexible    
1 accel./     
1 reactor 
Flexible    
2 accel./     
1 reactor 
Which is 
best? 
Initial capital 
expenditure 
(millions, £) 
1,305 1,305 1,325 1,595 Inflexible 
Maximum 
LCOE 
(£/MWh) 
N/A 87.15 64.99 61.94 
Flexible 
2 accel./ 
1 reactor 
Minimum 
LCOE 
(£/MWh) 
N/A 53.47 53.78 60.00 Inflexible 
 
b) Sensitivity Analysis 
The analysis above assumes a uniform probability among all three scenarios 
considered. Decision-makers might want to change these probability 
assignments, depending on information available at the time of decision-making. 
Alternatively they might be interested in the threshold probability assignments 
that trigger different decisions. 
 
Figure 9 shows a sensitivity analysis on the probability assignments for 
scenarios 1, 2, and 3, using E[LCOE] as the metric for decision-making. They 
show, in essence, that it is always better to go with the flexible approach, no 
matter what probability choice is made. Probability assignments may only affect 
the initial decision to go with a flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor design versus a 
flexible 2 accelerators/1 reactor design. 
 
The three-way sensitivity analysis varies probability assignments between 0 and 
1 for the optimistic, central, and pessimistic scenarios, always making sure they 
sum to unity. It calculates the E[LCOE] for each probability assignment, and 
shows which strategy is best between the inflexible design, and the two flexible 
strategies. This sensitivity analysis accounts for all possible assumptions about 
probability distributions (e.g. uniform, lognormal, normal, etc.). For example for 
the figure with p(central = 0.0), it is preferable to choose a flexible design over 
almost all possible probability assignments for the optimistic and pessimistic 
scenarios. This is shown by the diagonal and square hash areas representing the 
best decisions at any given probability assignment. The flexible 1 accelerator/1 
reactor is better than the flexible 2 accelerators/1 reactor design over a wider 
range of probabilities. There is a tiny, almost imperceptible area on the bottom 
right of the figure where p(central) = 0.0 where the best decision is to build 
inflexible. This area vanishes for p(central)  0.1. 
 
For brevity only examples with p(central) = {0.0; 0.1; 0.2} are shown in Figure 9. 
All other sensitivity analyses where p(central) > 0.2 result in the flexible 1 
accelerator/1 reactor strategy being preferable over a wider range of probability 
assignments as compared to the 2 accelerators/1 reactor flexible design. 
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Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis over the probability assignments for scenarios 1, 2, and 3. For brevity, 
only cases with p(central) = {0.0; 0.1; 0.2} are shown. For each value of p(central), light square hash 
areas correspond to probability combinations for optimistic and pessimistic scenarios where based 
on E[LCOE] the flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor strategy is favourable over the inflexible and flexible 
2 accelerators/1 reactor strategies. Dark diagonal hash areas correspond to probability 
combinations where the flexible 2 accelerators/1 reactor strategy is preferable over the inflexible 
and flexible 1 accelerator/1 reactor designs. The inflexible design is preferable for only a tiny 
combination of probability assignments, hardly noticeable on the bottom right of the figure for 
p(central) = 0.0. Blank areas correspond to infeasible probability assignments resulting in a sum 
greater than unity. 
 
 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents an integrated methodology to analyze the deployment cost 
of a new and promising nuclear technology subject to technological uncertainty, 
through a case example of a demonstration commercial thorium-fuelled ADSR 
park. The analysis shows that considering explicitly technological uncertainty 
and flexibility in the early conceptual design phase can reduce significantly the 
expected deployment LCOE (E[LCOE]). Under the model assumptions described 
in Table 1 and Steer et al. (2010), and the assumption of complete uncertainty 
about how effective availability will evolve in the first-of-a-kind phase (i.e. 
uniform prior probability distribution), the analysis shows a 12% reduction in 
expected LCOE for developing a demonstration reactor park as compared to an 
inflexible strategy. This is not negligible for such multi-billion pound project. 
This expected value cost reduction should be compared to the real acquisition 
cost of the flexibility. If the acquisition cost is lower than its expected value, 
decision-makers should benefit from it. 
 
Although other analytical tools can be used to value flexibility, there are many 
reasons motivating the use of decision analysis in this paper. For instance, one 
cannot assume that a portfolio of tradable assets exists to replicate the future 
cash flows of the first-of-a-kind ADSR park demonstrators. This rules out the 
risk-neutrality and arbitrage-enforced pricing assumptions that are used in 
classical real options methods (e.g. Cox et al., 1979; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Trigeorgis, 1996). Decision analysis is useful when an engineering project 
exhibits considerable path dependencies, suggesting a binomial lattice analysis 
(e.g. based on the work of Arnold and Crack, 2003; Cox et al., 1979) may not be 
appropriate in this case. It provides better transparency to decision-makers, and 
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enables relative rank ordering of different design choices based on approximate 
value rather than fair, economically rigorous market price. This greater 
transparency and ease of use comes at the expense of less economic rigor and 
the inability to analyze many uncertainty sources and stages. The complexity of 
rigorous economic real options analysis is, however, quoted as a deterrent 
against wider use in real-world practice (Barman and Nash, 2007; Engel and 
Browning, 2008).  
 
One downside from decision analysis relates to the choice of a probability 
distribution, for which data may not always be available. To circumvent this, a 
sensitivity analysis over all possible distributions is presented in Figure 9. It 
shows that flexibility is favourable under almost all cases, almost independent of 
the assumed probability distribution. 
 
The flexibilities elicited suggest a new design approach to demonstrating the 
deployment of an ADSR park. This approach differs from the typical ADSR design 
considering only one reactor and one accelerator. Providing contingencies for an 
additional accelerator gives additional flexibility from a strategic standpoint (i.e. 
the ability to add one accelerator if technology is less favourable than originally 
planned, but good enough to provide sufficient capacity). From an operational 
standpoint, this additional accelerator can reduce operational stress compared 
to a design where only one accelerator is used by enabling switching redundancy 
between the two. 
 
One limitation is that only one uncertainty source is considered here for 
simplicity, even though many more exist in reality. As a further step, a 
simulation-based screening model can be developed to account for more 
uncertainty sources, scenarios, and details in technology modelling, based on the 
work by Lin (2009), Wang (2005), and Yang (2009). The assessment can also be 
extended to include the possibility of driving ADSRs with multiple compact 
accelerators, such as non-scaling Fixed-Field Alternating Gradient (ns-FFAG) 
accelerators synchrotrons or superconducting cyclotrons. 
 
In conclusion, this paper highlights the importance of considering uncertainty 
and flexibility in the early conceptual design of new technological development, 
as opposed to later in the detailed design phase. Recognizing the additional value 
from flexibility – in terms of saved costs – may provide better support from a 
policy standpoint for public investment in R&D of such capital intensive, risky, 
but promising technological ventures. It should be clear that this methodology 
differs from sensitivity analysis because it incorporates decision-makers’ 
capacity to adapt to various situations along the development path. This 
assessment is more realistic than a typical DCF approach that does not recognize 
flexibility, and hence may result in overestimating the expected cost of the 
technological venture. 
 
 Acknowledgements 
The authors would like to thank gratefully the UK Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), the Electricity and Policy Research Group at 
the University of Cambridge, the National Science and Engineering Research 
 20 
Council of Canada, the MIT Portugal Program, and MIT Engineering Systems 
Division for their financial support. This work is supported, in part, by the EPSRC 
under grant EP/G009864/1. 
 
 References 
Abdelhamid, M.–B., Aloui, C., Chaton, C. (2009), “A Real Options Approach to 
Investing in the First Nuclear Power Plant Under Cost Uncertainty: Comparison 
with Natural Gas Power Plant for the Tunisian Case”, International Journal of Oil, 
2, 1, pp. 44-57. 
 
Arnold, T., Crack, T. (2003), “Option Pricing in the Real World: A Generalized 
Binomial Model with Applications to Real Options”, Working Paper, University of 
Richmond, Department of Finance. Available at http://www.ssrn.com 
 
Babajide, A., de Neufville, R., Cardin, M.-A. (2009), “Integrated Method for 
Designing Valuable Flexibility in Oil Development Projects”, SPE Projects, 
Facilities & Construction, 4, 2, pp. 3-12. 
 
Barman, B., Nash, K. (2007), “A Streamlined Real Options Model for Real Estate 
Development”, Joint Master of Science Thesis in Real Estate Development, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Biarrotte, J.-L. (2007), “Status of the EUROTRANS R&D Activities for ADS 
Accelerator Development”, Utilisation and Reliability of High Power Proton 
Accelerators (HPPA5) Workshop, Mol, Belgium. 
 
Bowman, C.D., Arthur, E.D., Lisowski, P.W., Lawrence, G.P., Jensen, R.J., Anderson, 
J.L., Blind, B., Cappiello, M., Davidson, J.W., England, T.R., Engel, L.N., Haight, R.C., 
Hughes, H.G. III, Ireland, J.R., Krakowski, R.A., LaBauve, R.J., Letellier, B.C., Perry, 
R.T., Russell, G.J, Staudhammer, K.P., Versamis, G., Wilson, W.B. (1992), “Nuclear-
Energy Generation and Waste Transmutation using an Accelerator-Driven 
Intense Thermal-Neutron Source”, Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics 
Research, Section A, 320, pp. 336-367. 
 
Cardin, M.-A., Kolfschoten, G., Frey, D., de Neufville, R. (2010), “Quantitative 
Experimental Evaluation of a Design Procedure Enabling Flexibility in 
Engineering Systems”, to be submitted to Research in Engineering Design. 
 
Carminati, F., Klapisch, R., Revol, J.P., Roche, C., Rubio, J.A., Rubbia, C. (1993), “An 
Energy Amplifier for Cleaner and Inexhaustible Nuclear Energy Production 
Driven by a Particle Beam Accelerator”, CERN/AT/93-47 (ET), European 
Organization for Nuclear Research. 
 
Cox, J.C., Ross, S.A., Rubenstein, M. (1979), “Options Pricing: A Simplified 
Approach”, Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 3, pp. 229-263. 
 
Deutch, J., Moniz, E., Ansolabehere, S., Driscoll, M., Gray, P.E., Holdren, J.P., 
Joskow, P.L., Lester, R.K., Todreas, N.E. (2003), The Future of Nuclear Power: An 
 21 
Interdisciplinary MIT Study, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
MA, USA. Available at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/ 
 
de Neufville, R., Scholtes, S. (2010), Flexibility in Design, in press, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
de Neufville, R., Odoni, A. R. (2003), Airport Systems Planning and Management, 
McGraw-Hill. 
 
de Weck, O., de Neufville, R., Chaize, M. (2004), “Staged Deployment of 
Communication Satellite Constellation in Low Earth Orbit”, Journal of Aerospace 
Computing, Information, and Communications, 1, 3, pp. 119-131. 
 
Dixit, A. K., Pindyck, R.S. (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, USA. 
 
Dong, Q. (2002), “Predicting and Managing System Interactions at Early Phase of 
the Product Development Process”, Doctoral Dissertation in Mechanical 
Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA. 
 
Engel, A., Browning, T.R. (2008), “Designing Systems for Adaptability by Means of 
Architecture Options”, Systems Engineering, 11, 2, pp. 125-146. 
 
Foster, J., Lee, B. (2009), “Sophisticated Sensitivity: Can Developers Guess 
Smarter?”, Master of Science Joint  Master of Science Thesis in Real Estate 
Development, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
Foster, D.G. (Ed.) (1974), “Review of PNL Study on Transmutation Processing of 
High Level Waste”, LA-UR, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. 
 
Jablonowski, C., Wiboonkij-Arphakul, C., Neuhold, M. (2008), “Estimating the Cost 
of Errors in Estimates Used During Concept Selection”, SPE Projects, Facilities & 
Construction, 3, 1, pp. 1-6. 
 
Kennedy, D. (2007), “New Nuclear Power Generation in the UK: Cost Benefit 
Analysis”, Energy Policy, 35, pp. 3701-3716. 
 
Kiriyama, E., Suzuki, A. (2004), “Use of Real Options in Nuclear Power Plant 
Valuation in the Presence of Uncertainty with CO2 Emission Credit”, Journal of 
Nuclear Science and Technology, 41, 7, pp. 756-764. 
 
Kwakkel, J., Walker, W.E., Marchau, V. (2010), “Assessing the Efficacy of Adaptive 
Airport Strategic Planning: Results from Computational Experiments”, submitted 
to Transport Policy. 
 
Lin, J. (2009), “Exploring Flexible Strategies in Engineering Systems Using 
Screening Models – Applications to Offshore Petroleum Projects”, Doctoral 
Dissertation in Engineering Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, 
USA. 
 22 
 
Loubergé, H., Villeneuve, S., Chesney, M. (2002), “Long-Term Risk Management of 
Nuclear Waste: A Real Options Approach”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and 
Control, 27, pp. 157-180. 
 
Luehrman, T. (1998), “Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started 
on the Numbers”, Harvard Business Review, July-August, pp. 3-15. 
 
Marreco, J., Carpio, L.G.T. (2006), “Flexibility Valuation in the Brazilian Power 
System: A Real Options Approach”, Energy Policy, 34, pp. 3749-3756. 
 
Moen, J. (2010), “Nuclear Power”, U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
Independent Statistics and Analysis, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/analysis/nuclearpower.html 
 
Morgan, M.G., Henrion, M. (1990), Uncertainty: A Guide to Dealing with 
Uncertainty in Quantitative Risk and Policy Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
 
Myers, S.C. (1977), “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 5, pp. 147-175. 
 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) (2000), “Reduction of Capital Costs of Nuclear 
Power Plants”, OECD, Paris, France. 
 
Pindyck, R.S. (2000), “Irreversibilities and the Timing of Environmental Policy”, 
Resource Energy Economics, 22, pp. 233-259. 
 
Pindyck, R.S. (1993), “Investments of Uncertain Cost”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 34, 1, pp. 53-76. 
 
Pouret, L., Buttery, N. and Nuttall, W.J. (2009), “Is Nuclear Power Flexible?” 
Nuclear Future, 5, 6, pp.333-341. 
 
Rothwell, G. (2006), “A Real Options Approach to Evaluating New Nuclear Power 
Plants”, The Energy Journal. 1, 27, pp. 37-53. 
 
Savage, S. (2000), “The Flaw of Averages”, San Jose Mercury News, October 8. 
 
Siddiqui, A., Fleten, S.E. (2008), “How to Proceed with Competing Alternative 
Energy Technologies: A Real Options Analysis”, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 
Paper No. 15502. 
 
 23 
Siddiqui, A., Fleten, S.E. (2008), “How to Proceed with the Thorium Nuclear 
Technology: A Real Options Analysis”, Research Report No. 297, Department of 
Statistical Science, University College London. Available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/Stats/research/reports/psfiles/rr297.pdf 
 
Silver, M.R., de Weck, O.L. (2007), “Time-Expanded Decision Networks: A 
Framework for Designing Evolvable Complex Systems”, Systems Engineering, 10, 
2, pp. 167-186. 
 
Steer, S.J., Nuttall, W.J., Parks, G.T., Gonçalves, L.V.N. (2009), “Predicting the 
Contractual Cost of Unplanned Shutdowns of Power Stations: An Accelerator-
Driven Subcritical Reactor Case Study”, submitted to Electric Power Systems 
Research. Electricity and Policy Research Group Working Paper EPRG0927, 
University of Cambridge. Available at: 
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/category/publications/working-paper-
series/2009/ 
 
Steer, S.J., Cardin, M.-A., Nuttall, W.J., Parks, G.T., Gonçalves, L.V.N. (2010), 
“Hedging Against Technology Risks of the Accelerator System of a First-of-a-Kind 
Accelerator-Driven Subcritical Reactor”, Electricity and Policy Research Group 
Working Paper EPRG1013, University of Cambridge. Available at: 
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/category/publications/working-paper-
series/ 
 
Taneja, P., Walker, W.E., Ligteringen, H., van Schuylenburg, M. (2010), “Adaptive 
Port Planning using Real Options”, International Association of Maritime 
Economists, CARGO Edições, Lda. 
 
Trigeorgis, L. (1996), Real Options, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
 
University of Chicago (2004), “The Economic Future of Nuclear Power – A Study 
Conducted at the University of Chicago”, Chicago, IL, USA. Available at 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/uoc-study.pdf 
 
Walker, W.E., Rahman, S.A., Cave, J. (2001), “Adaptive Policies, Policy Analysis, 
and Policy-Making”, European Journal of Operational Research, 128, pp. 282-289. 
 
Wang, T. (2005), “Real Options in Projects and Systems Design – Identification of 
Options and Solutions for Path Dependency”, Doctoral Dissertation in 
Engineering Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA. 
 
World Nuclear Association (2009), “Nuclear Power in the United Kingdom”, 
accessed on August 17, 2009. Available at http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf84.html 
 
Yang, Y. (2009), “A Screening Model to Explore Planning Decisions in Automotive 
Manufacturing Systems Under Demand Uncertainty”, Doctoral Dissertation in 
Engineering Systems, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA. 
